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BOOKS REVIEWED
Behind the Shield, the Police in Urban Society. By Arthur Niederhoffer.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co. 1967. Pp. 253. $5.95.
American society is undergoing a none too quiet revolution of attitudes. The
gap between what we do and what we say we believe in is being exposed on a
number of fronts. A society which espouses democracy, freedom and equal pro-
tection of the law for all has been made aware that a significant number of its
citizens are not equally treated. A society which prides itself on its affluence and
technology has realized that large numbers of its citizens are poor and ill-
equipped to live in a mobile, technological world of materiality. A society which
has espoused fairness in the adminstration of criminal justice has been forced by
the Supreme Court to adniit to its unfairness and inadequacies in that area. These
are just a few of the areas where theory and reality have been shown forcefully
to diverge. Hence, Americans are being required to revaluate their attitudes
and their values so as to try to close the gap.
In most of these turbulent areas of change, the police stand involved. They are
involved because they are charged with administering the status quo. But that is
just what is now under challenge. Mr. Niederhoffer addresses his book to an
analysis of the "police" both as an organization of law enforcement and as indi-
viduals. Although his focus is primarily upon the individual police officer and his
attitudes, Mr. Niederhoffer's book reveals a great deal about the police organiza-
tion as a bureaucratic system. Police organizations are caught in a divisive
struggle between the new drive for "professionalism" and the old order or au-
thoritarianism. The thrust toward "professionalism" represents an effort, pri-
marily by college educated superior officers to raise the status of the police, to
raise their level of expertise and qualification, to create a sense of ethics and
dedication to idealistic social service. A number of factors, not the least of which
being the low esteem in which police are held by the public, tends to frustrate
this drive. The efforts of the police elite to create an atmosphere of the policeman
as social scientist and professional is also resisted from within by the lower level
members of the force where success (if not survival) is measured by a tough
"lock-them-up" philosophy.
So, the individual police officer is faced with a double leveled dichotomy:
(1) the laws to be enforced and the traditional methods of enforcing them are
under wide social and legal challenge; (2) the urban police department in which
he is nurtured, trained and plays a role is riven by the struggle between the
"professional" philosophy and the bureaucratic authoritarian policies of the
traditionalists. What effect does this have on the individual policeman? This is
the primary focus of the author's concern.
Mr. Niederhoffer is a police lieutenant become sociologist. He is now Professor
of Sociology and Anthropology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the
City University of New York. His book is based on personal experience as an
officer in the New York City Police Department for twenty-one years, framed in
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the light of his studies and training in sociology. The approach is sociological
with many of the conclusions based on interviews and questionnaires. Inevitably,
the social scientist author interprets data in light of his pragmatic career ex-
perience as a police officer. This is the strength of the book; for, although it is
sometimes unevenly written, the reader gains new insight into the working of the
police system. Most importantly, insight is obtained as to the influence of the
police organization and milieu in shaping the mind of the individual police
officer.
The value of the book is that it does not speak of the police as merely a vague
organizational entity but takes the reader inside the system. The reader gains new
knowledge of how policemen think. He gains a disturbing view of the depth of
the problem of reshaping an urban police force into an agency of law enforce-
ment which is both effective and responsive to new concepts and challenges.
Most disturbing are the findings that, despite efforts to improve selection,
training and compensation of police officers, new recruits who come to police
service with idealistic thoughts quickly become cynics. The development of the
cynical view is traced and tested by the author from the beginning to the end
of a police officer's career. "Cynicism charts" and tables are presented to docu-
ment the fact that most police officers believe that one progresses in police work
by being tough, by having political influence, by playing the game of selective
law enforcement, and even, in a significant number of instances, by taking graft.
So, too, the police officer acquires a conservative and cynical view of life.
He becomes antagonistic to forces for change, legal or social. He develops an
authoritarian personality, perhaps even a fascist outlook. Thus, he is generally
attracted to conservative political groups and antagonistic to minority groups.
The feeling of group unity causes him to resist investigation of what he feels are
properly "police secrets," and to oppose civilian efforts to reorganize or reshape
the police force. In short, one gets the impression that the typical urban police-
man is alienated not only from the forces now at work to improve the standing
of minority groups and criminal defendants, but alienated from the professional
set of values being espoused by modem police adminstrators.
To the extent this is true, mere additional compensation, new training pro-
grams, civilian review boards and other panaceas suggested by civil rights groups
and such a prestigious group as the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice' may be inadequate to make police officers respon-
sive to the rights of individuals, minority groups, and to social change. This is
what the author implies. Unfortunately, he presents no real alternatives of his
own.
2
A "cynic" has been defined as one who believes that human conduct is moti-
vated wholly by self-interest. The author of this book refines and analyzes the
concept of cynicism in the context of the police world. Without going into all the
nuances here, it suffices to say that the police attitude is composed of the view
that they are the maligned guardians of order, people are degraded, society is
1. See "Task Force Report: The Police," U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1967.
2. See also American Civil Liberties Union, "Police Power and Citizens' Rights," 1967.
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hypocritical, and do-gooders will wreck this great society we have. If that sounds
inconsistent, recall that attitude need not be internally consistent to be firmly
held. Is it possible that the police and the hippies have something in common
after all?
A cynic reading this book might simply conclude that the police are not cynics
but realists. They see the world as it is. Lawyers (and perhaps an occasional law
teacher) sometimes take this view. Is it possible Mr. Niederhoffer fits here? He
does not say so, and indeed ends his book on a note of hope (which his facts
refute); but the context of the book reveals perhaps he is cynical as to real hope
for change. Or, is it possible he hopes for change in the police because he senses
that some of the challenges of today may presage some lesser degree of hypocrisy
in American society? It could be he thinks that out of all our present social up-
heaval the hypocrisy gap will be narrowed. If so, there would be less cause for
cynicism. But the author tells us not.
There is one other point that ought be mentioned. The work done by the
author basically was in connection with the New York Police Force. Perhaps
New York police are more cynical than any others. The writer of this review has
dealt with police in and around Boston as a practising attorney for fifteen years
and professor of criminal law. The cynicism which Mr. Niederhoffer describes is
confirmed by personal experience, but the extent of it is not. It could be that
larger urban departments suffer from greater cynicism than somewhat smaller
departments. Being neither a psychiatrist nor sociologist, this writer is not
equipped to answer the point. In any event, the existence of the attitudes Mr.
Niederhoffer describes and the fact that the police system creates them is a
significant social fact. Until this fact is understood, and the problems it raises
are resolved, meaningful progress will not be achieved in this area.
Is this book worth reading? Anyone interested in improving law enforcement
should read it; for, whether you accept this author's thesis or not, you will gain
some fresh insight into the mind of a policeman. In light of current challenges
to order and the fact that the police are in the forefront of response to that chal-
lenge, it is important to understand them whether your ideology makes you their
partisan or their adversary. Reading this book will enhance such understanding.
PAUL J. LiAcos*
Genesis of American Copyright Law. By Bruce W. Bugbee. Washington, D.C.:
Public Affairs Press. 1967. Pp. vii, 208. $6.00.
Introduction
Dr. Bugbee's stated purpose is to trace the European and early American
ancestry of the United States patent and copyright systems. His tenet is that
colonial and state development of legal protection for intellectual property was




of "fundamental importance" as precedent for our law in this area.1 The timely
appearance of this scholarly work at this juncture is most opportune. Our
patent and copyright systems are being closely scrutinized by the Congress at
this time.2 Fundamental principles are being challenged and a re-evaluation of
historical perspective is quite appropriate. This, Dr. Bugbee has effectively
accomplished with magnificent depth of scholarship.8 The author observes that
we are aware of relatively little of the origins of legal rights in intellectual
property4 and that errors and misconceptions about such beginnings frequently
damage the system. Armed with this prefatory warning the reader embarks
upon a remarkable voyage into a thorough and learned examination of the
labor pains suffered during the birth of American patent and copyright law.
Dr. Bugbee's well organized presentation is undertaken in chronological
order, except that copyright law is usually developed in separate sections since
it did not grow identically to the patent system. The first, second, third, and
sixth chapters are so divided. Chapter IV is exclusively about state patents, and
Chapter V is on state copyrights. The author has consulted mostly primary
sources, such as state and national archives, state and congressional journals,
and other original records. He has relied to some extent on the work of other
notable historians, such as E. Wyndham Hulme, Allan A. Gomme and Pasquale
J. Federico. Each chapter is replete with numerous references listed in footnote
form at the end of the book; 5 almost every statement is adequately documented.
Cases and statutes are liberally cited. The 5Y2 page index appears to be quite
useful.
This book is not only for the legal historian. Experienced attorneys will not
find the reading elementary. Indeed, Dr. Bugbee's proficiency0 with technical
concepts and terms may occasion the layman some difficulty. Some glossorial
1. B. Bugbee, Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law 2-3 (1967) thereinafter
referred to as Bugbeel. I am convinced that the American Patent Law is firmly founded
upon the English system, if not directly copied from it. See Klitzke, Historical Background
of the English Patent Law, 41 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 615 (1959).
2. See note 35, infra, and accompanying text.
3. A short, cursory review of the book is to be found at 2 Idea (Pat. T.M. & Copyr. J.
of Res. & Ed.) 265 (1967). The reviewer feels a strong "need for much more information,
particularly of a legal nature," but it is my observation that Dr. Bugbee has discharged
his responsibility to the early patent and copyright law remarkably well for a non-lawyer.
But see p. 623 infra.
4. Dr. Bugbee adopts Arthur W. Weil's definition of intellectual property as "rights
which result from the physical manifestation of original thought, either naturally or on
compliance with statute." A. Wel, American Copyright Law 5 (1917). Bugbee 3.
S. Some idea of Dr. Bugbee's thoroughness may be obtained from the number of foot-
notes: Ch. I: 60; Ch. II: 170; Ch. III: 76; Ch. IV: 55; Ch. V: 71; Ch. VI: 74; and Ch.
VII: 30. Most of the footnotes do not merely cite references but clarify and explain them
and contain a considerable amount of supplementary information not suitable for Inclusion
in the text. The review in Idea criticized the excess literature quotation in the text, but
unjustifiably so.
6. The Idea reviewer found "some minor errors relating to legal terms . . ." but con-
cedes that the book is "a workmanlike job." 2 Idea, supra note 3, at 265.
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effort towards basic terms is recorded in the introductory chapter, but the body
of the work frequently assumes familiarity with patent and copyright practice.
Such terms as "claims," 7 "infringing" and "specifications" 8 are used with little
detailed explanation. Thus, the attorney should not expect a mere proliferation
of simple historical facts. Dr. Bugbee serves us a diet of erudition pitched to
the intellectual appetite of the average lawyer.0
It must not be inferred that this work constitutes a total history of American
patent and copyright law. Such was not Dr. Bugbee's intent. His primary efforts
end with the patent and copyright law enactments of 1790. Cursory reference
is made to ensuing history in the short Epilogue, Chapter VII, but to other
historians is left the monumental task of developing the passage of the 1836
Patent Act and the 1909 Copyright Law, which remain the basic law forms
today. The Journal of the Patent Office Society is replete with work in this
latter area, as well as articles about the earlier history.10 But the period to which
Dr. Bugbee directs our attention is nowhere more lucidly and completely
unfurled than in his 138 pages of text.
European Origins
Renaissance Italy boasted the first known patents and copyrights, the 1421
Florentine grant to Filippo Brunelleschi for a river vessel being the world's
earliest true patent of invention.11 The first regular system of patent grants
7. Bugbee 103. The text refers to a 1789 Pennsylvanian patent grant to one Robert
Leslie. "Claims" are enunciations of the specific elements of the invention and define its
limits. They appear at the end of the patent specification and are the basis for suits for
infringement.
8. Admittedly the first paragraph introducing "specification" ends with "a full descrip-
tion of the invention and its operation which would show the scope of the patent." Bugbee
41. Subsequent use of the term is, however, not so enlightening. See, e.g., Bugbee 103. The
first Amnerican patent specification is not denoted as such. Bugbee 87. For the use of
"infringing" see Bugbee 18, in connection with the world's earliest true patent of invention,
that to Filippo Brunelieschi.
9. Dr. Bugbee is a history professor at Gettysburg College, Pennsylvania, but has
assisted his father, a patent attorney in drafting patent specifications. His patent back-
ground is evident in the zeal with which he differentiates between patents and monopolies
in the introductory chapter, occupying three full pages of text to do so. Bughee 6-9. Most
patent attorneys eagerly disclaim any resemblance of patents to monopolies because of the
unsavory connotation of the latter term, due, no doubt, to the historical repugnance. Con-
sidered as an exclusive right to manufacture a particular article (Black's Law Dictionary
1158 (4th ed. 1957), the term monopoly is not incongruent with patent. The United States
Patent Act grants the patentee the right to "e-xdude" others from making, using or selling
the invention throughout the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1954).
10. See, e.g., Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. Pat. Off.
Soc'y 615 (1959), and the synopses of the European and American Patent Systems in The
Encyclopedia of Patent Practice and Invention Management 384-404 (R. Calvert ed. 1964).
11. Bugbee 17-19. Brunelleschi's grant extended for three years and the work of anyone
imitating his invention was to be burned. A. Gomme, Patents of Invention; Origin and
Growth of the Patent System in Britain 6 (1946). There were, of course, a number of
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developed in Venice a few decades after the Brunelleschi patent and the first
general patent law was enacted in the Venetian Republic in 1474, one hundred
and fifty years before the English Statute of Monopolies. 12
Little patent progress prevailed elsewhere on the Continent but a number
of English grants appeared, inspired by the memorable petition of Jacobus
Acontius in 1559. His patent was not issued until 1565, and Burchard Cranick's
1563 patent for water draining "Engeynes" was probably England's first grant
for true invention rather than for mere importation. Parliament's enactment of
the famed Statute of Monopolies of 16241 ended a period of arbitrary monop-
olistic grants by English monarchs to favored subjects who were not necessarily
inventors. It specifically gave exclusive grants to the first and true inventor
of a manufacture, but specified no procedure by which the inventor might
obtain his "privilege" or defend against infringers. The Statute, therefore, was
no advance over its Venetian predecessor of 1474, under which the inventor
received his patent as a matter of right. Furthermore, the granting of monop-
olies for non-inventions did not, in fact, end with the passage of the English
Statute. 14
Like the earliest patents, the first known copyrights also appeared in Renais-
sance Italy. Privileges relating to books and printing were granted by the
Venetian government between 1469 and 1517, the first being that awarded
John of Speyer in 1469. The Venetian Senate enacted a copyright statute in
1517, but it failed to require publication within a certain time, nor did it define
a new work, and the Venetian presses frequently printed copyrighted works
of authors without their consent. Sixteenth century Germany evolved a highly
developed copyright system. Musical compositions, designs and even trademarks
were protected.15
The British copyright system was to become the most influential in the world.
At first, only printers' licenses were granted. The first recorded English copy-
right issued to an author was awarded in 1530 to John Palsgrave. The 1710
copyright Statute of Anne' 6 enacted by Parliament, although bearing some
earlier recognitions of invention which Bugbee does not mention. See Klitzke, Historical
Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 615, at 617 (1959). In about
500 B.C. in Sybaris, a Greek colony famous for luxurious living and self-indulgence, If
any confectioner or cook invented a peculiar and exclusive dish, no one else was allowed
to make it for a year. Athenaeus, "The Deipnosephists," 3 Bohn's Classical Library 835
(1854).
12. Bugbee 22-24.
13. 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1624).
14. Bugbee 38-40, English industry, lagging behind the rest of the world, needed careful
fostering at this time. The early sixteenth century saw England as still mainly pastoral
and mining. The English cloth industry was the first to gain any prominence and was
developed through early privilege grants, many of which were not for invention. The
growth of the English patent system at this time can be directly attributed to England's
conscious awareness of the need for manufacturing industry.
15. Bugbee 43-49.
16. 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710).
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resemblance to the Statute of Monopolies, was much more concerned with rights
and remedies than was the latter.17
American Colonial Period
The American colonial period witnessed some attempts to stimulate industry
by means of exclusive grants, but patents to original inventors constituted only
a small proportion of colonial grants. America's first patents of invention ap-
peared in Massachusetts in the 1640's and 1650's, a 1641 patent to one Samuel
Winslow for a salt-making process being the first known patent for invention
in America. The precursor of general patent statutes in the future United States
was a 1641 clause passed by the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, pro-
hibiting monopolies but excepting new inventions. The first copyright statute
in the New World was passed by the Massachusetts Colony in 1672, in response
to a petition of John Usher, the first bookseller in that Colony.' 8
The early American patent institution was modest in its proportions and
irregular in its course. Born in Massachusetts in the 1640's, the system was
most prominent in South Carolina by the middle of the eighteenth century.
Colonial patents had greater legal and constitutional than economic significance
because American industrialists were not sufficiently interested to press for wide-
spread recognition of property rights in inventions. Although no province
erected a true patent system, a reservoir of patent-granting experience emerged
because of scattered colonial enactments, to be drawn upon by future legis-
latures when political and economic conditions were more favorable."9
State Patents
The distractions and conflict of the Revolutionary War halted the inter-
mittent progression of the American patent system. The 1780's, however,
brought a new outpouring of patents of invention, stimulated by a widespread
desire to develop domestic industry. The first American patent associated with
a written description of the invention, i.e., a specification, was awarded by
Pennsylvania to Henry Guest in 1779 for the manufacture of oil and blubber,
and soon thereafter other states began to require some disclosure of operation.
One grant by Pennsylvania to Robert Leslie in 1789 contained an early set of
patent claims. The state patents of the 1780's, despite their colonial origins,
showed greater similarities between states than had the colonial predecessors. 0
Individual patents granted by separate states proved to be unsatisfactory.
Inventions were used and sold across state lines and inventors were required to
apply in every state. The advantage of the uniformity and broader protection
of a centralized federal patent system was apparent. The Articles of Confed-
eration in 1777 had not transferred the protection of inventive property to
the national scene, and by 1787 the granting of state patents was at its peak.2 '
17. Bugbee 49-56.
18. Id. at 57-66.
19. Id. at 82-83.





Towards the end of the Revolutionary War the view arose that the young
Republic required a crown of literary achievement of its own equal to that of
the Old World, but there was wholesale piracy by printers of foreign works.
Beginning in 1782 Noah Webster, lexicographer, journalist, author and teacher,
became lobbyist for copyright protection, and traveled from state to state,
urging passage of copyright laws. Connecticut, Webster's home state, founded
the first state copyright system by enacting a general copyright law in 1783
and by securing individual copyrights under it. Six of the original thirteen
states enacted general copyright laws in 1783 and six more followed during the
three ensuing years. Bugbee points out that state copyright laws of the 1780's
have been widely attributed to the influence of Noah Webster, but the many
errors in Webster's account of his campaign raise serious doubts as to his
effectiveness. Furthermore, Webster was primarily interested in securing pri-
vate, personal copyrights. 22
Like the provincial patent institutions, the state copyright laws of the 1780's
furnished precedent upon which federal legislation would later be erected. Dr.
Bugbee considers English influence to be of greater import in the short history
of the early American copyrights than in patents because the Statute of Anne
devoted so much more attention to intellectual property rights than had the
earlier Statute of Monopolies. 28 It must be noted, however, that the English
law of patents included several landmark cases which greatly influenced the
conception of intellectual property law in America. Our founders were familiar
with them.
United States Patent and Copyright Systems
James Madison, in a paper on the weaknesses of the Federation in 1787,
deplored the want of uniformity of literary property rights, but made no men-
tion of patents. When the Constitutional Convention convened some weeks
thereafter, both Madison and Charles Pinckney (a delegate from South Caro-
lina) offered proposals to give the federal government the power to grant
patents for useful inventions and to secure for authors exclusive rights for a
certain time. Pinckney was the primary proponent of federal power to issue
patents of invention, but federal copyright authority was probably proposed
by both Madison and Pinckney. It was during the crucial year of 1787 that the
proposed intellectual property clause was drafted and reported to the Conven-
tion, thus marking the culmination of the provincial patent and copyright
movements and the turning point in the law of intellectual property rights.
The clause was approved unanimously, without recorded debate, on September
5, 1787. It had been foreshadowed by a Congressional Resolution of 1783 and
climaxed the growth of intellectual property in early America. It stands as
22. Id. at 104-23.
23. Id. at 124. But see the quotation from an 1813 letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Isaac McPherson that indicates that England was copied when the American patent system
was formed. Id. at 165 n.1.
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article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have the
Power . .. to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries ... ." Interestingly, no direct reference to
property, patents or copyrights as such appears in this enabling clause.2 4
In 1789, the 1st Congress having just opened its first session, patent and
copyright petitions began to pour in. A combination patent-copyright bill was
submitted in 1789 but did not pass. On April 10, 1790, a patent bill did pass
and the initial legal structure of the United States patent system was formally
established. The 1790 bill had provided for the publication of descriptions of
inventions in newspapers, but this was deleted by the Senate. The patentee was
not expressly granted a property right, but only the sole and exclusive right
and liberty of making and selling his invention. This was unlike the grants of
privilege of the Statute of Monopoly but more like provisions in state patents
of the 1780's. On May 31, 1790, a federal copyright law was enacted which bore
considerable resemblance to the 1710 Statute of Anne.2 The 1790 United States
patent and copyright systems represented a considerable fund of experience
accumulated on both sides of the Atlantic. Inventors, quickly responsive to
the federal legislation, greatly impressed Jefferson, the number of applications
being beyond his anticipation. Many of the inventions were trifling, but some
were, he thought, of great consequence.20 With the laws of 1790, Dr. Bughee's
dissertation by and large ends.
Epilogue
Finally, in Chapter VII, Epilogue, all the subsequent United States patent
and copyright law history is outlined. Initially, the first examining entity, the
three-man "Patent Board," is discussed. Patent examination procedure had
been unknown in England but had been foreshadowed by examining committees
in colonial and state legislatures. Some fifty-seven awards were made by the
Board under the Patent Act of 1790. The first Patent Board was comprised
of Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of War Henry Knox and
Attorney General Edmund Randolph. Part-time patent examination by busy,
high government officials proved unsatisfactory. A 1793 law, repealing the 1790
patent statute, dispensed with the requirement of verification of novelty and a
system of mere registration was initiated. Grants were indiscriminately awarded
to applicants who alleged they were true inventors.27
A Patent Office was established in 1802 as a distinct division of the Depart-
ment of State. By late 1835 over 9,000 grants had been issued under the 1793
statute, but the lack of examination for novelty had opened the door to fraud
and duplication. In 1836, therefore, all federal inventive property laws were
repealed and the patent system was reorganized. The Patent Office was raised
to the status of a separate bureau under the Department of State. Patent
24. Id. at 125-29.
25. Id. at 131-45.
26. Id. at 148.
27. Id. at 149-50.
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applications were again, as originally, examined for novelty. Other nations fol-
lowed this lead during the next century, although France adhered to the mere
registration practice.28 A Commissioner of Patents and a staff of full time
professionals was provided for. As in the laws of 1790 and 1793, applications
were to be accompanied by specifications and drawings, and, when necessary,
models. Fourteen years was continued as the maximum patent term, but seven
additional years could be obtained under certain circumstances.2 0 A major
modification was passed in 1870, and there was further revision and codifica-
tion in 1952, but these were primarily improvements upon the basic statute of
1836. The Patent Act of 1952 added a new statutory criterion of patentability,
the test of non-obviousness. Novelty and utility had been the sole statutory
tests since the Patent Act of 1793.30
In 1831 the United States copyright system was generally revised and the
measures of 1790 and 1802 were repealed. As under the law of 1790, only
American citizens could obtain United States copyrights, and piracy of Euro-
pean works by American publishers continued. In 1870 a major reform of the
copyright system was undertaken, and the granting of copyrights was assigned
to the Library of Congress, which still discharges this function. It is Dr. Bug-
bee's opinion that American literary property legislation was, in some respects,
less progressive than British statutes. In 1909 a third general revision of the
United States Copyrights System was undertaken and it substantially assumed
its present form.31
The patent bar is currently immersed in a dispute over revision of the United
States Patent Act. A presidential Commission to study the Patent System has
proposed sweeping revisions and an administration-sponsored so-called Patent
Reform Act was submitted to both houses of the Congress in early 1967.82
The Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law of the American Bar
Association, at its 1967 annual meeting, supported some of the principles of
the proposed legislation but vigorously opposed other provisions. The House
of Delegates went on record as opposing enactment of these bills, being par-
ticularly anxious to defeat the proposal to award a patent to the first applicant
to file rather than to the original inventor, as under present law.83 The pro-
posed bills would also eliminate the one-year grace period within which an
applicant can file after the public use or sale of his invention. Many patent
28. Dr. Bugbee briefly discusses the later development of the French and British patent
systems near the end of the book. Id. at 153-94. The French law actually evolved In 1790-91.
29. The present seventeen-year term was enacted in 1861 as a compromise to eliminate
the seven-year extension.
30. Id. at 150-53.
31. Id. at 155-57.
32. S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See
Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System (1966), which precipitated the
1967 Patent Reform Act.
33. 12 Am. Bar News, No. 9, at 3 (1967). The winner of the race to the Patent Office
would be deemed to be the first inventor, as a matter of lawI
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attorneys have vehemently decried the proposed changes. One writer has char-
acterized the bill as a regression to the severe law of the 1793 Act.3 4
The United States copyright laws are also now being carefully examined by
the Congress. Following twelve active years of study by both House and Senate
Judiciary Committees, bills were introduced to effect basic changes in the
system.35 The House bill was passed in April, 1967, but the Senate version has
not yet been reported out of committee. The copyright bar has supported the
progressive modernization and general improvement which the legislation would
effectuate. The maximum period of copyright protection would be lengthened
from the present fifty-six years to the life span of the owner plus fifty years
and protection would be extended to "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression". Juke box record playing and community
antenna television systems3 6 would also be protected, although the House
stripped the latter provision from the bill before passage.
Faced with these possibilities of major revision of our patent and copyright
systems, it is at this time highly advisable to return with Dr. Bugbee to the
historical foundations upon which they were erected. We can find no finer guide
than this book, and it is definitely recommended as important reading.
RAmON A. KxTrrzic*
34. See Blaustein, The Presidential Commission and the Return to the Patent Act of
1793, 53 A.BAJ. 911 (1967). Conversely, the President denoted the 1967 Patent Reform
Act a "long overdue" modernization. The President's Letter to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House Transmitting the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 1967
(Feb. 21, 1967).
35. The current versions of these bills are: S. 597, 90th Cong., ist Sess. (1967); H.R.
2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The forerunners of these bills were introduced in the
89th Congress.
36. See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 25S F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd, 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), holding that operation of a community antenna
television system constitutes a "public performance" which infringed plaintiffs exclusive
right to perform its copyrighted motion pictures in public. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 389 U.S. 969 (1967). CATV would fare better under the limited exemption in
the proposed copyright bills.
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
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